



FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

VOLUME 38 NUMBER 16

NATO Gains by Cyprus Settlement

by Mario Rossi

While the members of NATO, which celebrated its tenth anniversary on April 4, were wrestling with problems of strengthening and expanding their ties, NATO could take satisfaction in one important achievement: settlement of the Cyprus problem. With the agreement reached in London on February 19, granting an independent status to Cyprus, the Eastern Mediterranean island overlooking the shores of Anatolia to the north and of Syria and Israel to the south once again becomes the heart of the Levant.

This highly satisfactory and unexpected solution was achieved by the parties to the dispute once they realized that their traditional positions were undermining their common security and strategic interests. One event in particular brought about this realization—the spread of Communist influence in Iraq and the oil-rich Persian Gulf area.

The debate on the Cyprus question before the United Nations General Assembly late in 1958 had shown some progress toward compromise (see FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN, February 1), but an agreement appeared to be a long way off. The British, who had acquired the administration of Cyprus from Turkey in

1878 and had turned the island into a crown colony following World War I, had agreed to a form of limited partnership with the Cypriotes while retaining sovereign rights for at least another seven years. Turkey, on behalf of the Turkish minority which represents 18 percent of the population and some 40 percent of the island's economic interests, was in favor of the British plan, failing which it demanded partition. On behalf of the Cypriotes of Greek origin Archbishop Makarios demanded independence for the island, abandoning his previous insistence on *enosis* (union with Greece). This formula was agreeable to Athens but unsatisfactory to Ankara, since it offered no safeguards for the Turks in the island and no security guarantees for Turkey.

Following the abandonment of the Suez Canal area in 1955, the British had turned Cyprus into the main military base for the protection of their interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. The agreement with Egypt provided that in certain emergencies Britain could send troops back to the Canal Zone. Iraq was then a faithful ally and friend, and a member of the Baghdad

MAY 1, 1959

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION INCORPORATED
345 EAST 46TH STREET NEW YORK 17, NEW YORK
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pact, in which Britain was also active. Jordan drew an annual subsidy from London and its army was commanded by a Britisher.

During the past three years, however, the picture has profoundly changed. Shortly after signing its agreement with Britain, Egypt began receiving arms from the U.S.S.R. and became an advocate of "positive neutralism" and anti-Westernism. The Anglo-French attack against Suez in November 1956 ended in failure, showing that the days when the West could protect its interests in that part of the world by force were over. In 1956, Jordan fired Glubb Pasha, its British military commander, and forsook London's annual subsidy. Then came the overthrow of the pro-British monarchy in Iraq, the advent of a regime which enabled communism to gain strength, and finally, on March 24, abandonment of the Baghdad pact.

Common Danger Spurs Accord

In terms of Middle Eastern policy Cyprus had lost much of its value for Britain. The island, however, retained its importance as an advanced Western base within the framework of the North Atlantic alliance for the containment of the U.S.S.R. To fulfill this function the cooperation of Greece and Turkey was indispensable, since both belong to NATO. Britain, which in the past had often played on the antagonism between the two countries, now did its best to bring them together and make them realize their common interest.

Athens and Ankara did not need

too much encouragement, since the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean had become a threat to their security as well. Turkey is surrounded by unfriendly neighbors: it is the only NATO member which has a common frontier with the Soviet Union; it shares a long border with Bulgaria; its relations with Syria have long been tense; Iraq, once a good friend, may in the future represent a menace. Had Turkey's hostility toward Greece over Cyprus become acute, or permanent in case of an unacceptable solution, the Turks would have found themselves completely surrounded by hostile countries. Greece, for its part, has a common border with Turkey, and numerous Greek islands are situated just off the Turkish coast. The turn of events in the Middle East had also served to remind Greece of its precarious isolation from Western Europe. In the face of dangers threatening the whole area, Greece realized that its security outside the NATO framework is nil.

The arguments which influenced Athens proved equally cogent to Archbishop Makarios. The pro-Western and American-educated Archbishop accepted the validity of the strategic considerations which underlined the urgent need for a compromise. The struggle against British occupation in the island was led by General George Grivas—a rightist and anti-Communist patriot, leader of the E.O.K.A. (the Greek Cypriote terror organization)—who has returned to Greece since the settlement. But while his men were fighting the

British, the pro-Communist forces in the island were organizing for a take-over and becoming progressively stronger. The Archbishop had abandoned the principle of *enosis* when he realized the dangers implicit in its ethnic appeal, and the possible far-reaching consequences of which the precedent of Danzig is a painful reminder. When he switched to the formula of independence, a compromise became inevitable.

The agreement worked out by the foreign ministers of Turkey and Greece in Zurich, and shortly after ratified in London, takes these various factors into account. At the end of February 1960 Cyprus will become an independent republic. The president will be a Greek Cypriote assisted by a Turkish vice-president with veto powers. Britain will retain sovereign rights over its military bases. Greece and Turkey will maintain an armed contingent on the island. Any of the three powers can intervene, if need be, to reestablish the *status quo*.

Thanks to the agreement Turkey is no longer isolated as before; Greece, the cradle of Western civilization, is resuming its influence in the Mediterranean; Cyprus is once more at peace. Everything seems to indicate that wisdom and a will to compromise have composed the conflict between national self-determination and the strategic requirements of NATO.

Writer and lecturer, Mr. Rossi for the past five years has reported for *The Christian Science Monitor* on Middle Eastern, Southeast Asian and Northern African events as reflected at the United Nations.

Published twice a month by the FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, INC., 345 East 46th Street, New York 17, N.Y., U.S.A. EDITORIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE: JOHN S. BADEAU • BENJAMIN J. BUTTENWIESER • JANE PERRY CLARK CAREY • BROOKS EMERY • WILLIAM P. GRAY • AUGUST HECKSCHER • HAROLD F. LINDER • MARGARET PARTON • STEPHEN H. STACKPOLE. • President, JOHN W. NASON • Editor, VERA MICHELES DEAN. • *Washington Contributor*, NEAL STANFORD • Assistant Editor, GWEN CROWE. • The Foreign Policy Association contributes to the public understanding by presenting a cross-section of views on world affairs. The Association as an organization takes no position on international issues. Any opinions expressed in its publications are those of the authors. • Subscription Rates: \$4.00 a year; single copies 20 cents. RE-ENTERED AS SECOND-CLASS MATTER SEPTEMBER 26, 1951 AT THE POST OFFICE AT NEW YORK, N.Y., UNDER THE ACT OF MARCH 3, 1879. Please allow one month for change of address. Contents of this BULLETIN may be reproduced with credit to the Foreign Policy Association.



What Future for Mutual Security?

President Eisenhower has asked for \$3.93 billion for the mutual security program for the coming fiscal year, 1959-60.

"Mutual security" is, unfortunately, better known by its misnomer, "foreign aid." And foreign aid, too, is a misnomer, for this aid is not "foreign" except in one way—the fact that its visible end products generally show up abroad. Actually over 75 percent of all mutual security funds are spent in the United States; and even those spent abroad benefit the United States by making it possible for foreign countries receiving such funds to buy more goods from Uncle Sam. Moreover, some 530,000 people in the United States are employed on a full-time basis as a result of this program; and half a million jobs or more are not to be lightly dismissed given the present situation in the labor market.

The important thing, however, is that the "muscle" which mutual security funds put on the military forces and the economies of our allies and friends, while necessarily visible abroad, is a direct addition to our own security and defense strength. And everyone in Washington, from the President down, will tell you that you get more, much more, defense strength per dollar from mutual security than if such funds were spent on building up our own military posture here.

Will the President get his requested \$3.93 billion for mutual security? He will not, if the past is any criterion. Congress has a habit of cutting mutual security requests each year by a quarter or a third. Last year President Eisenhower asked for \$3,942,100,000 (some \$12

million more than this year), and finally wound up with only \$3,298,092,500—or about \$644 million less than he requested.

This year, however, could be different. In fact, this year Congress might—just possibly—give the President not only what he wants, but more. For one thing, there is at present an explosive East-West crisis over Berlin, and a summit meeting expected this summer. And cold war crises give Congress second thoughts about wielding the axe on anything that has to do with military posture and security. For another thing, President Eisenhower this year has gone to bat for his program as an "irreducible minimum"—whereas in the past his lukewarm attitude toward the mutual security program was not only surprising to many, but alarming to some. And, too, the President plans to ask Congress for an emergency supplemental fund on top of the \$3.93 billion.

Full Aid May Be Voted

The President's blue-ribbon star-studded Draper committee—headed by William H. Draper, Jr., former Under Secretary of the Army—which was asked to study the country's military assistance program, presumably with a view to trimming it, has, instead, come up with a preliminary report urging an extra \$400 million immediately. This amount would serve to put the NATO countries in Europe on a war-ready basis—particularly as regards communications, computing systems, radar nets, and so on. So while it is hard to believe that Congress will not pare the President's original mutual security request by

several hundred million dollars, his supplemental request may in the end bring him nearly as much if not more than his original request.

Since "mutual security" is apparently little understood by the public, it may be useful to list and briefly discuss its seven categories. The first, and largest, is "military assistance"—or military hardware for our allies. Of the \$3.93 billion the President is requesting, \$1.6 billion would go for planes, tanks and missiles. The second largest category is "defense support," for which the President is asking \$835 million aid to allies in maintaining their own considerable military establishments—for example, South Korea, Formosa, Turkey. The third largest item is \$700 million for the Development Loan Fund. This fund, set up a little more than a year ago, to make "soft" loans to underdeveloped countries, has proved a great success. It has received applications for nearly \$3 billion, but has had only \$700 million to work with. The new \$700 million requested, says President Eisenhower, is the "bare minimum" needed.

Then there is \$272 million for "special assistance"—including world health programs and economic aid to crisis spots; \$211 million for "technical assistance," which emphasizes sharing know-how; and \$200 million for a "contingency fund" which the President insists he must have if he is to have ready funds to meet unexpected political and military crises. Finally, \$112 million is asked for "other programs"—a catch-all for miscellaneous programs and pay increases.

In any discussion of mutual se-

(Continued on page 128)



The Impact of Tibet

The Tibetan revolt against the rule of Communist China, news of which began to seep out through Indian sources in mid-March, promises to mark a historic turning point in the triangular relationship of non-Western countries with the West, on the one hand, and the Communist bloc on the other. Experts on Chinese affairs do not expect that this revolt will affect the power of the Peiping government in mainland China. But Peiping's treatment of the Tibetans is already deeply affecting the attitude of Asian countries toward Communist China as a world power.

It is important for the West to understand the reason for this change. Hitherto, many Asians had regarded "imperialism" as synonymous with "colonialism." This, in turn, was associated with the Western nations—Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Portugal—which in the age of exploration and expansion had acquired territories in Asia and Africa, and after the breakup of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, in the Middle East as well. Thus in non-Western eyes imperialism became a symbol of the unequal treatment accorded by the white man to his non-white colonial subjects. What Westerners referred to as the "white man's burden" was regarded by non-Westerners as the white man's yoke.

Japan's conquest of Southeast Asia in the 1930's did not dispel this conviction, for the Japanese, being Asians who challenged and, for a time, seemed on the point of defeating the West, were regarded by many Asians as harbingers of their own long-hoped-for liberation from Western rule. Had the Japanese consolidated their victories, and retained power, they would doubtless have

suffered the onus of being regarded as new imperialists—as was the case with Japan's domination of Formosa and Korea and its aggression against China in the 1930's. Their defeat and withdrawal left the Asian colonial peoples once more face to face with white rulers, some of whom made an orderly peaceful withdrawal (the British in India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, Malaya), while others relinquished their possessions with marked reluctance (the Dutch in Indonesia) or after a bloody struggle (the French in Indochina in 1955).

Changed Attitude on China

Meanwhile, China had long been regarded by Asians, not as a colony of the West—even in years of most far-reaching internal disintegration China preserved its own government—but as a victim of the kind of intervention and unequal treatment by Western powers which colonialism had come to represent.

Given these circumstances, the take over of power by the Chinese Communists in 1949 was viewed by many Asians, not merely as an internal revolution, but as a legitimate national liberation from Western encroachments. Nor was Peiping's military occupation of Tibet in 1950 regarded as an imperialist move, because this remote land, high in the Himalayas, had been dominated in the 18th century by the Manchus of China who, after a brief invasion of Tibet by the British in 1904 restored their hegemony in 1910 and suppressed a revolt at that time, quartering troops in Lhasa. Thus, historically, Tibet, although regarding itself as an autonomous area, was viewed as having long been under the suzerainty of China.

The Tibetans, however, in their mountain retreat, had developed a society of their own, dominated by Lamaism, a form of Buddhism, whose high priest, the Dalai Lama, with his seat in the Tibetan capital, Lhasa, is believed to be a living god, the incarnation of Lord Buddha himself. Thus the present Dalai Lama, aged 23, is a national, as well as a religious symbol. The rival Panchen Lama, aged 21, who heads a smaller sect at Shigatse, is regarded as an incarnation of a lesser Buddha.

After the Chinese Communists—in their drive to assert their rule over all areas historically claimed by China—had occupied Tibet, they imposed a treaty in 1951 in which they pledged autonomy to Tibet, with no change in the political position, status or power of the Dalai Lama. Under the treaty a Chinese military and administrative committee was to be established in Tibet, the Tibetan army was to be absorbed into that of China and Peiping was to control Tibet's external relations.

Peiping, however, found it difficult to establish its authority over the Dalai Lama and the Buddhist monks who comprise a considerable portion of the 1.3 million population. The Chinese Communists have tried to strengthen the influence of the Dalai Lama's rival, the Panchen Lama, who is believed to be more amenable to Peiping's influence. The Khambas, a tribe located in the southeast area of the country, had revolted against Peiping as early as 1956. In the summer of 1958 they had established their own local authority. When the population of Lhasa joined the Khambas, Peiping tried to arrest the Dalai Lama in March, and at that

(Continued on page 127)



Nyasaland: Causes of Turmoil

by Channing B. Richardson

Dr. Richardson, associate professor of government at Hamilton College since 1952, spent the year 1957-58 in the Central African Federation, including Nyasaland, on Ford Foundation and Fulbright fellowships.

The political disturbances which have been shaking the British Protectorate of Nyasaland demonstrate the rising power of African nationalism. They are protests against things that have happened in the past, as well as against things that may happen in the future.

In 1953 Nyasaland was brought into the Central African Federation against the will of such African public opinion as could be expressed. In 1960, Nyasaland fears that it will lose its status as a protectorate if the federation becomes a dominion within the British Commonwealth. This would mean that the British Colonial Office, which is still in control of most of its affairs, would give up this responsibility, and the federal government—dominated by the white settlers of Southern Rhodesia—would take over. Should that happen, dreams of independence for Nyasaland; according to its leaders, would be submerged, and Southern Rhodesian policy on racial affairs would predominate. To prevent this eventuality, the Nyasalanders feel they must make their protests heard now, before it is too late.

Four Targets of Protests

These protests are directed against four main political targets. First, it is hoped that they will show the Colonial Office the depth and reality of Nyasaland's fears about domination by Southern Rhodesia. The territory has been under the control of the office since 1889, with the result that it has had "liberal" racial and political policies, at least as compared

to those followed in Southern Rhodesia. The reason for this may well be that even now only 7,000 European settlers live in this beautiful land. It should be pointed out, too, that "liberalism" was applied slowly and reluctantly. Nevertheless, it is true to say that under the Colonial Office, and especially since 1953, evidences of racial discrimination have been declining, while opportunities for political participation by Africans have been on the increase. Those African leaders who take a moderate view wish the Colonial Office to remain in control for a few more years, to train them in the arts of self-government and then turn the protectorate over to an all-African government.

Discrimination Opposed

The second target is a multiple one; consisting of Sir Roy Welensky, prime minister of Southern Rhodesia, his federal government in Salisbury and all Europeans in Southern Rhodesia. It is known throughout Nyasaland that Sir Roy has said "the Colonial Office must get out of Central Africa," that he feels it has been far too "soft" on the Africans and has pushed them too rapidly toward self-government. It is also well known that in Southern Rhodesia Africans must carry passes, cannot enter hotels or restaurants, have no representation on municipal councils and none in the territorial Parliament, and cannot bring in their wives and families when they migrate from Nyasaland in search of jobs. Less known is the recent pro-

gress made to eliminate some of these pinpricks of discrimination.

The third target of the protests consists of British public opinion and the British Parliament. When the federation was established in 1953, the British public was convinced that "partnership between the races" was to be the goal of the new country. Most Britishers were unaware that Nyasaland was very reluctant to be joined to the new federation. The current disturbances, it is hoped, will arouse Britain to the feeling of the Nyasalanders. The British Parliament, which still retains the ultimate control over both Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, it is felt, must also be convinced that the "partnership" promised in 1953 has not been achieved. Above all, it must be convinced that the desire of the federation's 275,000 Europeans for dominion status (and thus freedom from Parliamentary and Colonial Office interference) in 1960 is contrary to the desires of 2.6 million Africans in Nyasaland and probably the 4.5 million others in Northern and Southern Rhodesia. When ordinary political channels for influencing policy are unavailable, resort is made to extra-legal methods. Thus the Nyasaland disturbances are being used to influence the Parliament and people of England.

The fourth target of the disturbances is the people of Nyasaland themselves. The episode to date has proved an education in political affairs and organization designed to create the nucleus of a shadow government. In this respect it represents

a stage through which all nationalist movements seem to go in preparing themselves for the eventual take over of power. In the process much harm is done to ideas and values. Moderation and compromise become bad words in the nationalist vocabulary. Whatever the outcome, it must be hoped that the slender roots of democracy planted in Nyasaland will survive the storm.

Desire for Independence

The affirmative side of the turmoil in Nyasaland is the people's desire for independence and self-government. The Nyasaland leader, Dr. Hastings Banda, head of the Nyasaland branch of the African National Congress and a physician who for many years had a successful practice in London, has voiced this desire. "Nyasaland," he says, "must break away from federation—and the sooner the better for all races. I am determined to bring this about and I do not care what I have to suffer in doing so."

His statement holds the threat of extremism. But it also hints at a solution. A way might be found for Nyasaland to have an all-African government yet stay within the federation and enjoy the clear economic advantages which this would bring. Dr. Banda has said a good many things, some of them contradictory. Before an African audience and in the excitement of a meeting, he is apt to become exceedingly vituperative. At other times, however, he has said: "In the Nyasaland of the future black and white must work together," or "Nyasaland will remain within the Commonwealth—if we are allowed to," or "I want self-rule for Nyasaland by negotiation." He has frequently denied that he is against the European, declaring, "I have lived in Britain too long to be that."

What lessons can be learned from

the 1959 disturbances? In Southern Rhodesia an emergency was declared on February 26, five days before this was done in Nyasaland, seat of the riot. Over 500 persons were arrested in the federation as a whole, including a well-known and respected European, Guy Clutton-Brock (now released). Sir Roy's federal government seized a member of the British House of Commons, John Stonehouse, and deported him from Northern Rhodesia. An Unlawful Organizations Bill was introduced in the Southern Rhodesian Parliament which was so destructive of every provision for the judicial protection of the individual that even the Opposition party, a strongly white supremacist group, protested against it; and it was withdrawn for revision. Rumors flew that the Union of South Africa had troops poised to come to the aid of the federation. Sir Roy issued vague warnings of communism and made specific complaints against the influence of Ghana.

Southern Rhodesia Frightened

There is no doubt that the federal government, headed by Sir Roy, as well as the Southern Rhodesian territorial government, was frightened by the Nyasaland riot. "Murder, massacre and widespread violence were being planned," it has been stated, although no evidence has yet been adduced for this. From the point of view of a minority white group settled in Africa, these are understandable reactions. "Law and order," it is said, must be preserved at all costs. The need to proclaim an emergency is not seen as a failure of racial partnership, but rather as proof that the European knows how to defend himself. "I was not elected as prime minister in order to preside over the dissolution of the federation and I have no intention of ever doing so," Sir Roy announced. And for the present, at least, peace and order

seem to be returning to the area.

The reaction of the Colonial Office and of its two governors of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia has been more circumspect. Both governors delayed their proclamation of emergency until, apparently, the federal government applied pressure on them through London. Both are now searching quickly for ways and means of opening up negotiations for increased African political participation in the affairs of the two northern protectorates. In Northern Rhodesia, the banning of Kenneth Kaunda's Zambia African National Congress has opened the way for the Northern Rhodesian African National Congress to participate in elections and the process of governing. This is in contrast to the banning of the Southern Rhodesian Congress and the jailing of its leaders. Moreover, the governor of Northern Rhodesia has appointed two Africans as ministers in his Executive Council—the first such appointments in Central Africa. And Sir Roy's party failed to obtain a majority of the Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council.

Meanwhile, in Nyasaland, the governor is continuing his search for new political and electoral devices to increase African influence in the government. And he, too, has at hand an able African leader, Wellington Chirwa, who may see that an appealing political future would be open to an African who would assume the role of moderate leader, in place of the violent Dr. Banda, who is under detention.

It is evident that the Colonial Office will not be frightened off its liberal course either by the Nyasaland disturbances or by the continuing guerrilla warfare carried on against it by the white settlers of Central Africa.

British public opinion has reacted strongly against both the acts of violence of the Africans and the racial

discrimination it revealed in the federation. "This is not the century to shoot Africans," one British newsman cabled back home. Students in London have staged demonstrations against the use of troops. The British government has appointed a four-man Commission of Inquiry to look into the disturbances. This point has not been lost on Africans, since after the Mau Mau emergency in Kenya (1950-55) a British Commission of Inquiry suggested many far-reaching land and political reforms. While differing on many points, the leaders of both Conservative and Labor parties agree that in the 1960 talks the federation must present evidence of substantial progress toward racial partnership in Central Africa. The Nyasaland disturbances will make this bipartisanship even more firm. Lord Home, Secretary for Commonwealth Relations, on his March visit to the federation, stated this strongly to Sir Roy and he recently announced that "partnership there must be if there is not to be war."

Role of European Moderates

Perhaps the most important reaction to events in Nyasaland has been that of the important group of liberal Europeans in the federation. In the past their leader, the Hon. R. S. Garfield Todd, had served as prime minister of Southern Rhodesia. During his tour of office he instituted many moderate reforms which have aided the African in his fight for more and better education, improved hospitals and increased job opportunities. Yet for the past few years the tide had been flowing against Mr. Todd and his supporters. He himself and his party had been ejected from a coalition with Sir Roy, defeated twice at the polls and seemingly driven into the political wilderness.

It is significant, however, that none of these defeats seems to have perma-

nently removed Mr. Todd from the politics of the federation. Known to Africans throughout the country as a man they can trust and as one who, however slowly from their point of view, would move in the directions they wish, Mr. Todd nevertheless keeps the political loyalty of probably 12 percent of the European electorate. He has just established a new political party, the Central Africa party, which may never win an election but will keep the pressure on Sir Roy to move toward partnership, and may even, by winning a few seats in various elections, hold the balance of power. Mr. Todd's courage and high political ability, plus the support of a measurable fraction of the European voters, may prove the best insurance policy available within the federation. But, as he says, "time is running out," and "the color bar must be broken massively and immediately" if federation is to survive.

Thus the disturbances in Nyasaland have served to point up the basic dilemmas of the federation, unresolved in its six years of existence. From the point of view of Commonwealth and world relations, Britain cannot afford to allow the white settlers to hold over 7 million Africans in economic and political subordination. From the point of view of those white settlers, however, Africa is their country, where they plan to live permanently and to which they have made a substantial contribution. Some have lived in the federation for three generations, longer than most of the Africans, who have migrated within 50 years. From the point of view of the moderate African, his right to the land and wealth of the country is clear, yet he acknowledges his need for European skill and leadership. To the extremist African, too, the picture is clear. It is "we or they."

From the point of view of Mr.

Todd's followers, there is still time to grant those concessions of social, political and economic affairs he has urged since 1953 which, he believes, could convince the African that his cherished aims will be accomplished. He will doubtless applaud the action of Sir Roy in making the able African, J. Z. Savanhu, a parliamentary secretary. But, he will add, time is not on the side of the European in Central Africa.

READING SUGGESTIONS: A. J. Hanna, *Beginnings of Nyasaland and North-eastern Rhodesia, 1859-95* (London, Oxford University Press, 1956); *Annual Report on Nyasaland* (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1957); Philip Mason, *The Birth of A Dilemma: The Conquest and Settlement of Rhodesia* (London, New York, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1958); M. J. Morris, *A Brief History of Nyasaland* (London, Longmans, 1952).

Spotlight

(Continued from page 124)

time 13,000 Buddhist monks joined the revolt. Fighting broke out in Lhasa, and the Dalai Lama fled southward. The Tibetan cabinet, on March 25, denounced the treaty with China and proclaimed Tibet's independence. On March 28 Peiping proclaimed the end of the Dalai Lama's rule and his replacement by the Panchen Lama. The Chinese then charged that the revolt had been sparked by Western "imperialists" abetting the Chinese Nationalists on Formosa (who had meanwhile stated they had made air-drops in Tibet and had pledged aid and ultimate independence to the area); and that Tibetans living at Kalimpong, on India's territory, had played a part in the uprising.

The Asian country most immediately concerned with events in Tibet is India, which borders on that area. When the British ruled India, they claimed a special interest in Tibet, which India had inherited. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had questioned China in 1951 about the status of Tibet and had urged Peiping to give it autonomy. While

Peiping had not directly answered Mr. Nehru's suggestion, the pledge of autonomy contained in the 1951 treaty had been accepted by India as satisfactory. Subsequently, India had endeavored to maintain friendly relations with its powerful neighbor, China, and had encouraged other Asian countries—notably at the conference of Asian-African countries at Bandung in 1955—to accept the five principles of peaceful coexistence (*Panchsheel*) which India and China had agreed on in New Delhi in 1954.

India's Concern

Peiping's ruthless suppression of the Tibetan revolt came as a shock to India. Speaking in Parliament on March 30, Mr. Nehru, who had previously rejected Peiping's complaint about parliamentary discussion of Tibet, said that the Chinese Communists had violated their pledge of autonomy. Mr. Nehru also expressed India's sympathy for the Tibetans, and subsequently declared that he was seeking to bring about a peaceful settlement through diplomacy. On April 2 the Dalai Lama took refuge on India's territory. On April 18 he declared that Peiping had broken all its promises about Tibetan autonomy.

Whatever may be the outcome of the Tibetan revolt, it has had the effect of causing Asians, even those who follow a neutralist policy, to assert that the nonwhite rulers of

Communist China are practicing "imperialism," which was once associated solely with Western whites. For example, *The Daily Times* of Jakarta in Indonesia said: "This picture of Asians kicking Asians is not a pleasant one." Another Indonesian newspaper said that this event "may cause Communist China to lose all her friends." *The Hindustan Times*, in an editorial entitled "The Rape of Tibet" declared: "Much else could die with Tibet if we do not even now heed the warning," and urged reassessment of "the basis of our foreign policy."

What happened in Tibet stirred Asians far more than what happened in Hungary, because the Hungarian revolt was regarded as a struggle between two white peoples. This does not mean that the Asian countries will intervene militarily on behalf of Tibet. India, the most powerful of them, with an army of 400,000, is not in a position to attack Communist China, with an army of 2.5 million. It should be borne in mind that the United States, the strongest military power in the world, did not issue a military challenge to Russia in the case of Hungary, in spite of its promises of "liberation." Nor will China's actions in Tibet make Asians less sensitive to Western methods in Algeria or South Africa, where whites continue to treat nonwhites in a colonial manner.

The significance of Tibet is that it has aroused Asians to put moral pressure on Peiping, as they had previously done on the West, for independence or autonomy of peoples under foreign rule. Paradoxical as it may seem to Americans, many Asians believe that this pressure could be more effectively applied if Communist China was in the UN.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

Newsletter

(Continued from page 123)

curity there should be some mention of the "pipeline," or military hardware in process of production. Six years ago there was some \$8.5 billion in the pipeline, whereas now the sum is down to \$2.6 billion. This means, to put it crudely, that the mutual security program has been living off its pipeline to the tune of nearly \$1 billion a year.

When the mutual security debate waxes hot in Congress, we shall hear some horrifying tales of mismanagement, mistakes and stupidities in administration. These, however, are the exception rather than the rule and as much a result of honest misjudgment as of the frequent need for making rapid decisions to meet fast-moving military, political and economic developments.

NEAL STANFORD

FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN 345 East 46th Street, New York 17, N.Y.

In this issue:

NATO Gains by Cyprus Settlement—M. Rossi	121
What Future for Mutual Security?— N. Stanford	123
The Impact of Tibet—V. M. Dean	124
Nyasaland: Causes of Turmoil— C. B. Richardson	125

In the next issue:

A Foreign Policy Forum— Should U.S. Support World Law?	
---	--

MR. PAUL MANLEY
17917 SCHENELY AVE.
CLEVELAND 19, OHIO

PBN-3